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THE “MALE PROBLEMATIC” AND THE PROBLEMS OF 
FAMILY LAW: A RESPONSE TO DON BROWNING’S 
“CRITICAL FAMILISM” 
Linda C. McClain* 
INTRODUCTION 
I am grateful to Professor Don Browning for engaging with my book, The 
Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility.1  
Professor Browning is a prolific and thoughtful scholar as well as a prominent 
participant in the marriage movement, which aims to restore a “marriage 
culture” and promote the institution of marriage.2  The “critical familism” 
approach to the American family debate, developed by Browning and his 
colleagues in the multiyear Religion, Culture, and Family Project,3 has 
contributed to the intellectual underpinning of the marriage movement.  An 
aim of my book is to contribute to the ongoing conversation about the place of 
families—and of marriage—in our political order, as well as to enter into 
constructive dialogue about family law and policy.  To that end, my book takes 
up and critically evaluates positions advanced by the marriage movement on 
issues ranging from governmental promotion of marriage to whether family 
law should extend protection to a broader range of family forms. 
In this response to Professor Browning’s review,4 I will use the relationship 
between “the male problematic” and the problems of family law as an 
 
 * Rivkin Radler Distinguished Professor of Law, Hofstra University. B.A., Oberlin College; M.A., 
University of Chicago Divinity School; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; LL.M., New York 
University School of Law.  Thanks to Don Browning for a helpful discussion about his review and to Maxine 
Eichner and Elizabeth Glazer for valuable comments on some of the points made in this Essay.  I thank Emory 
Law Journal for providing a forum for this exchange between Professor Browning and me. 
 1 LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 
(2006). 
 2 For this movement’s aims, see COAL. FOR MARRIAGE, FAMILY & COUPLES EDUC. ET AL., THE 
MARRIAGE MOVEMENT: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (2000), http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/ 
marriagemovement.pdf. 
 3 See generally DON S. BROWNING ET AL., FROM CULTURE WARS TO COMMON GROUND: RELIGION AND 
THE AMERICAN FAMILY DEBATE (2d ed. 2000). 
 4 Don S. Browning, Linda McClain’s The Place of Families and Contemporary Family Law: A Critique 
from Critical Familism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1383 (2007). 
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organizing theme.  “The problem of fatherhood,” or what Browning calls “the 
male problematic,” is a central concern of the marriage movement: Marriage 
addresses a core societal challenge—binding men to the mothers of the 
children they foster and securing men’s paternal investment in those children.5  
The problem of fatherhood is also a major topic in Professor Browning’s 
review.  First, he contends that my critique in The Place of Families of the 
marriage movement’s appeals to restore marriage’s role in domesticating men 
and women’s role as sexual gatekeepers is too sweeping and does not 
adequately appreciate his account of “the male problematic” and of the 
purposes of marriage.6 
Second, he argues that a limitation of The Place of Families is that it gives 
inadequate attention to what he calls “premoral or nonmoral goods” that are 
relevant to the well-being of families and children, particularly the “premoral 
good of fatherhood.”7  This leaves my approach, he argues, vulnerable to 
becoming a sort of indiscriminate acceptance of any and all family forms in the 
name of “family diversity”8 or “equality in and between families.”9  Professor 
Browning views the supposed limits of my own engagement with this question 
of “premoral goods” as illustrative of a broader failing in contemporary family 
law and family law theory.10  One aim of his review, thus, is to ask whether 
and how theological accounts of contemporary families and the challenges 
they face, such as his model of “critical familism,” should inform family law 
and policy.11 
Third, Browning contends that my book’s supposed inattention to the good 
of fatherhood, coupled with my commitment to governmental promotion of 
equality within and among families, leads to an approach to family law and 
policy that is both too “top down” and too accepting of family diversity.12  
According to his view, I am too wary of relying on families and other 
institutions of civil society (particularly religious institutions) to generate 
virtues and too ready to employ government for the aggressive promotion—in 
 
 5 See infra Part I for discussion.  Professor Browning introduces the term “male problematic” in 
BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 68–69. 
 6 See Browning, supra note 4, at 1397–99. 
 7 Id. at 1393, 1394. 
 8 Id. at 1384. 
 9 Id. at 1402. 
 10 Id. at 1384–85. 
 11 Id. at 1403–05. 
 12 Id. at 1401–03. 
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families—of norms like sex equality.13  Yet, in the name of diversity, I am 
overly skeptical of governmental efforts to promote responsible fatherhood and 
marriage.  This critique raises the question of how my approach and critical 
familism differ on the proper relationship among the family, other institutions 
of civil society, and the government.  Because Professor Browning’s own 
“critical familism” is notable within the marriage movement for its affirmation 
of the place of sex equality in marriage and family policy, it is worth exploring 
whether and how our approaches to sex equality truly differ. 
This Essay will first address the contention that my account of “the male 
problematic” is itself problematic.  I review what The Place of Families 
actually says on this matter.  It is certainly true that Browning and many others 
in the marriage movement focus on the role of the institution of marriage as 
encouraging paternal investment.  However, it is no caricature to say that at 
least some in the marriage movement also invoke the role of women as sexual 
gatekeepers to lead men to marriage and, thus, to responsible paternal 
investment. 
Next, I ask whether The Place of Families contains its own version both of 
a “male problematic” and of a “good” of fatherhood.  I ponder how that 
account compares with that offered in the marriage movement and how it bears 
on the problems of family law.  In doing so, I also address the charge that The 
Place of Families eschews a discussion of the “premoral or nonmoral goods” 
at play in the institution of the family.  I will explain how my approach to 
family law recognizes certain goods of family life as well as important 
functions associated with families.  Care will be my primary example since 
both my approach and critical familism stress the importance of parental care.  
I also explain that my commitment to equality within and among families does 
not inevitably lead to an indiscriminate pluralism.  Here I suggest points of 
convergence and divergence with critical familism’s own “marriage plus” 
approach.14 
Finally, I will offer some preliminary thoughts about Browning’s broader 
question about whether and how “critical familism” can contribute to family 
law and legal theory about families.  In particular, I explain that my project in 
The Place of Families, by contrast to Professor Browning’s critical familism 
project, was not to synthesize and critically retrieve religious tradition, but to 
offer a helpful framework, grounded in family law and liberal and feminist 
 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
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political theory, for approaching contentious debates about the place of 
families in our political order and a number of issues of family law.  My 
approach to family law is, by necessity, critical in substantial part because of 
the history of family law’s embrace and perpetuation of inequality within the 
family.  Just as “critical familism” has had to critique as well as synthesize 
tradition, feminist theory has had to critically assess traditions of family law as 
well as social practices.  I reject, however, the charge that my approach is 
overly mistrustful of the institutions of civil society. 
I. THE “MALE PROBLEMATIC” IN THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT 
“The problem of fatherhood,” or what Browning calls “the male 
problematic,”15 has been a key theme in writings by the marriage movement.  
An influential text in launching the “responsible fatherhood” movement was 
David Blankenhorn’s book, Fatherless America: Confronting Our Most 
Urgent Social Problem.16  Since the publication of that book in 1995, 
Blankenhorn’s Institute for American Values (IAV) has included responsible 
fatherhood and marriage as core parts of its agenda.  Over the last decade, 
Professor Browning’s Religion, Culture, and Family Project has published 
many books addressing the issues of marriage and family.17  In 2000, the 
Religion, Culture, and Family Project and Blankenhorn’s Institute cosponsored 
a document, The Marriage Movement: A Statement of Principles,18 which has 
become a reference point for the self-styled “marriage movement.”  Writings 
sponsored by the marriage movement continually argue that one key function 
marriage serves in society is to link fathers, who naturally have a weaker 
relationship to children than do mothers, to children.19 
Professor Browning contends that my book misunderstands “the link 
between marriage and fatherhood,” suggesting that the way I characterize this 
link “probably only fits the theory of George Gilder” and certainly does not fit 
 
 15 BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 68–69. 
 16 DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 
(1995). 
 17 See, e.g., HERBERT ANDERSON ET AL., THE FAMILY HANDBOOK (1998); BROWNING ET AL., supra note 
3. 
 18 COAL. FOR MARRIAGE, FAMILY & COUPLES EDUC. ET AL., supra note 2. 
 19 INST. FOR AM. VALUES & INST. FOR MARRIAGE & PUBLIC POLICY, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW: A 
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 25–26 (2006), http://law.nd.edu/news/marriagestatement.pdf; INST. FOR AM. 
VALUES ET AL., THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW 13 (2005). 
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Browning’s own views.20  In particular, he states that I mistakenly think that he 
and some others in the marriage movement argue “that in marriage, wives 
domesticate the erratic and polygamous sexual inclinations of men,” such that 
“[women] should be the gatekeeper[s] to sexual access and morality.”21  His 
argument, he counters, is not about “the gatekeeping role of woman,” but “the 
channeling power of marriage as a public institution.  Marriage as an 
institution integrates men into the care of their children through the channeling 
power of public expectations, legal sanctions, institutional signaling, and, 
historically, the religious ideas of sacrament and covenant.”22  The point is to 
help to “actualize a father’s capacity for care.”23 
Browning helpfully distinguishes between two different arguments about 
how to secure responsible fatherhood.  The first, which he and some others in 
the marriage movement make, is that it is through the institution of marriage 
that society attempts to encourage and secure responsible fatherhood.24  Here 
they draw on Carl Schneider’s familiar idea of the channelling function of 
family law: A basic purpose of family law is to support fundamental social 
institutions, like marriage and parenthood, and to steer people into 
participating in them.25  For example, family law supports the social institution 
of marriage as the proper place for men and women to form exclusive intimate 
attachments, reproduce, and parent, and it steers men and women into that 
institution.  The second argument, which Browning disclaims, is that it is 
through the sexual gatekeeping of women (that is, by women exercising sexual 
modesty and restraint) that men are led into—channelled into—the institution 
of marriage.26 
To be sure, Browning’s account of the “male problematic” does not appeal 
to the gatekeeping role of women.  But The Place of Families does not say that 
he does so.  Some in the marriage movement do, however, make this sexual 
gatekeeping argument, and I do address those arguments in my book.  To 
 
 20 Browning, supra note 4, at 1395. 
 21 Id. at 1394. 
 22 Id. at 1395. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id.  
 25 Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 498 (1992).  I 
discuss the relevance of Professor Schneider’s notion of the channelling function to contemporary family law 
debates in a recent article.  Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the 
Channelling Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 101 (2007). 
 26 Browning, supra note 4, at 1395–96. 
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clarify this point, I will revisit briefly the treatment in The Place of Families of 
these two lines of argument. 
The Place of Families notes that the problem of fatherhood is one of 
several arguments made by the marriage movement as to why society should 
restore a marriage culture and why government should shore up the institution 
of marriage.27  The book quotes from the testimony before Congress of David 
Popenoe, co-director of the National Marriage Project, given in a hearing on 
welfare and marriage: “[B]eing a father is universally problematic for men in a 
way [that being a mother] is not for women. . . .  Marriage is society’s way of 
engaging the basic problem of fatherhood—how to hold the father to the 
stronger mother-child bond.”28  It refers to Don Browning’s work, noting, 
“The marriage movement speaks of a ‘male problematic’ that promoting 
marriage is thought to address: men’s inclination toward procreating without 
taking responsibility for children.”29  Browning identifies a complementary 
“female problematic”—“women’s inclination toward procreating and rearing 
children, even in the absence of adequate resources and commitment by fathers 
and at the expense of self.”30  A third example offered is the arguments made 
in James Q. Wilson’s book, The Marriage Problem.31 
Wilson, Browning, and other figures in the marriage movement have 
looked to evolutionary science’s teaching about differences in male and female 
parental investment as providing evidence of the “male problematic” and 
“female problematic.”32  The idea is that men and women have “asymmetric” 
reproductive strategies resulting in a naturally greater maternal than paternal 
investment in children.33  Evolutionary science, Wilson contends, explains that 
men are inclined to “maximize” their reproductive fitness by following a 
pattern of having sex with many women, thus producing many children, rather 
than being monogamous.34  Browning, similarly, discusses the work of 
evolutionary theorist Robert Trivers on parental investment and evolutionary 
 
 27 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 119–20. 
 28 Id. at 120 (quoting Welfare and Marriage Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources 
of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 107th Cong. 44–45 (2001) (statement of David Popenoe, co-director of 
the National Marriage Project)) (emphasis added). 
 29 Id. at 135–36 (citing BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 22, 68–69). 
 30 Id. (citing BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 22, 68–69). 
 31 Id. (citing JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM 28–31 (2002) (Society creates marriage to 
defeat men’s “natural tendency to depart from a relationship with a mother and child,” and to force men to 
provide necessary resources.)). 
 32 See BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 68–69, 106–13; WILSON, supra note 31, at 25–27. 
 33 See BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 68–69, 106–13. 
 34 WILSON, supra note 31, at 26. 
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psychologist David Buss on mate selection preferences.35  The basic idea is 
that men are more inclined toward a strategy of multiple sex partners, whereas 
women tend to be more selective because they make a far greater investment in 
reproduction than do men.36  This follows both from the fact that an egg is far 
larger than a sperm and that gestation involves a far greater investment than 
ejaculation.37  Moreover, the biological connection between mother and child 
is clear in a way that the connection between father and child is not.38 
As a shorthand, my book refers to this set of ideas about the problem of 
fatherhood as the domestication argument: “[S]ociety requires marriage to 
domesticate men”39 or, put otherwise, to “tame” or “civilize” men.40  I raise 
several objections to the domestication argument as a justification for 
governmental promotion of marriage.  First, I argue that “if men need not only 
marriage itself but also such hallmarks of traditional marriage as being head of 
the household, then promoting this form of marriage directly conflicts with 
respecting women’s equality.”41  Here, I am responding to sociologist Steven 
Nock’s argument, in Marriage in Men’s Lives, that marriage plays a very 
central role in how men establish a sense of masculinity and that one core idea 
that most Americans share about marriage is that “[t]he husband is the head, 
and principal earner, in a marriage.”42  Although Nock appears to intend the 
term “head of household” simply to connote primary earner, studies of gender 
roles within marriage, as my book explains, find that “head of household” 
connotes leadership and authority within the household.43  I also point to some 
ethnographic studies suggesting that when men perceive that they are not 
economically able to establish themselves as head of the household, they may 
not marry.44 
Browning contends that I present an account of the domesticating power of 
marriage—and women—that is probably only true of George Gilder.45  To set 
 
 35 BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 109–11. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 112. 
 39 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 121, 136. 
 40 Id. at 135–36. 
 41 Id. at 136–37. 
 42 Id. at 135–37 (quoting STEVEN NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES 6, 58–59 (1998)). 
 43 Id. at 137 (discussing the well-known study, PHILLIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN 
COUPLES (1983)). 
 44 Id. at 139 (discussing ideal of the “decent daddy” in ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET 183, 189 
(1999)). 
 45 Browning, supra note 4, at 1395. 
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the record straight: I characterize George Gilder as a “conservative welfare 
pundit of the 1980s,”46 not as a part of the contemporary marriage movement.  
My reference to his ideas is in the context of observing that “[s]ome argue that 
men will not accept the role of ‘responsible father’ and husband without the 
perks of head of household,”47 namely, “a sense of masculine dominance.”48  I 
counter this view by noting that some studies of engaged fathering suggest that 
such fatherhood need not rest on household dominance.49  It is in this context 
that I state, “Constitutional norms of sex equality forbid government from 
using the law to reinforce a model of family responsibilities that installs men as 
leaders and providers and women as followers and dependents, or to advance 
similar schemes of unequal responsibility.”50  My concern there and here is 
with the use of governmental funds to promote “healthy marriage.”  I argue 
that any governmental funding of marriage education should be consistent with 
the constitutional and political value of sex equality.51 
I raise other objections to the domestication argument.  I note that 
“skepticism about appeals to ‘nature’ or to sex differences as a justification for 
policy is in order,” in view of the “long history of such appeals to justify sex-
based restrictions on women’s citizenship and gender hierarchy in families and 
civil society.”52  I also suggest that studies of some men’s practices of 
responsible fatherhood outside of marriage “cast doubt on the claim that only 
marriage can secure such commitment.”53  I reinforce this last argument by 
noting a conclusion in one federally commissioned report that “to the extent 
that social policy is constructed through the lens of the traditional nuclear 
family model, new forms of responsible fathering by biological fathers or 
stepfathers are likely to be constrained.”54 
Browning focuses in particular on my criticism that the portrait of men 
painted in the domestication argument “insults their capacity to be morally 
responsible agents” and “reinforces women’s familiar role as gatekeepers—
 
 46 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 140. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. (quoting GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 136 (1981)). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 137. 
 51 Id. at 147–54. 
 52 Id. at 137. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 140 (quoting FED. INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD & FAMILY STATISTICS, NURTURING 
FATHERHOOD: IMPROVING DATA AND RESEARCH ON MALE FERTILITY, FAMILY FORMATION AND FATHERHOOD 
146 (June 1998), http://fatherhood.hhs.gov/CFSForum/NurturingFatherhood.pdf). 
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morally responsible for themselves and for men in the areas of sexuality and 
family.”55  He suggests that I do not appreciate his distinction between 
society’s reliance on the power of the institution of marriage as such in 
anchoring men’s paternal investment in offspring and its reliance on sexual 
gatekeeping by women to bring men to marriage.56  I do recognize the 
distinction, but my point is that both of these lines of argument are made by 
figures in the marriage movement.  And they have a logical connection, after 
all.  If the institution of marriage exerts a salutary influence on men by 
anchoring paternal care and linking the father to the mother and child, it is 
women’s gatekeeping that brings men into marriage itself, instead of pursuing 
alternative paths of more unruly, irresponsible sexuality. 
Browning does not make the gatekeeping argument but some prominent 
figures in the marriage movement do.  Marriage movement leader David 
Popenoe looks both to the institution of marriage (as explained above)57 and to 
the gatekeeping role of women as ways to address the problem of fatherhood.  
In pondering what it would take for society to establish a “strong marriage 
system,” Popenoe states that this will rest upon a more culturally restrictive 
sexual system, which in turn will depend on women’s “leadership” since 
women are “traditionally assumed to the gatekeepers of sexuality.”58  While 
Popenoe believes that a return to complete sexual restraint before marriage is 
probably not feasible in contemporary society, he does suggest that the old 
grandmotherly wisdom “dictates a measure of [a woman] playing hard to get,” 
such as refusing to cohabit without a clear plan to marry.59 
My book discusses Popenoe’s observation about gatekeeping in the context 
of a critique of contemporary calls to revive courtship as a better way to steer 
young women and men to marriage.60  Courtship is on the marriage movement 
agenda.  In a report critical of contemporary dating patterns on college 
campuses, authors Norval Glenn and Elizabeth Marquardt call for new models 
of courtship as a way to provide young women with helpful pathways to 
 
 55 Id. at 137. 
 56 Browning, supra note 4, at 1395. 
 57 See supra text accompanying note 28. 
 58 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 256, 286 (quoting David Popenoe, A Marriage Research Agenda for the 
Twenty-First Century: Ten Critical Questions, in REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 195, 197–98 (Alan J. Hawkins et al. eds., 2002)). 
 59 Id. at 286 (quoting DAVID POPENOE & BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, 
SHOULD WE LIVE TOGETHER?: WHAT YOUNG ADULTS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT COHABITATION BEFORE 
MARRIAGE 15 (2d ed. 2002)). 
 60 Id. at 281–89. 
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marriage.61  My book contends that the current emphasis in federal policy on 
abstinence-only-until-marriage sex education and calls by some in the marriage 
movement to revive courtship both rely on a notion of women as sexual 
gatekeepers. 
Sexual gatekeeping by women, for example, is a central element in the call 
to revive courtship by Amy and Leon Kass, both participants in the marriage 
movement.62  They argue that restoring “sensible sexual mores, pointing 
toward marriage” is only possible if a majority of women reassert the virtue of 
sexual self-restraint.63  Their writing on courtship treats female chastity as a 
“reproductive strategy”—an attempt by a woman to “attach the man 
exclusively and permanently to the woman through erotic love and to make 
him thereby also love and care for her—their—children.”64  Here, the 
complementarity of manly ardor and female modesty work in tandem to bring 
men to marriage: Kass and Kass identify as the “central truth about sexual 
manners and mores” that “it is women who control and teach them.”65  In this 
vein, Leon Kass argues that when female modesty became the “first casualty” 
of the sexual revolution, “even women eager for marriage lost their greatest 
power to hold and discipline their prospective mates.”66 
I do not, therefore, mischaracterize the marriage movement when I observe 
that “prominent accounts of courtship assign women a special responsibility 
for gatekeeping: women, by exercising their feminine virtue of modesty, 
discipline male sexual appetite by insisting on marriage as the prerequisite for 
sexual access.”67  Nowhere do I state that this is a uniform view within the 
marriage movement or that Browning advances it.  But the examples of 
Popenoe and of Kass and Kass indicate that within the marriage movement, 
some do appeal to restoring sexual gatekeeping by women as a way to bring 
back a strong marriage culture. 
 
 61 NORVAL GLENN & ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, INST. FOR AM. VALUES, HOOKING UP, HANGING OUT, 
AND HOPING FOR MR. RIGHT: COLLEGE WOMEN ON DATING AND MATING TODAY 40–41 (2001). 
 62 See COAL. FOR MARRIAGE, FAMILY & COUPLES EDUC. ET AL., supra note 2, at 27 (showing that both 
Amy and Leon Kass signed The Marriage Movement: A Statement of Principles). 
 63 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 286 (quoting Amy A. Kass & Leon R. Kass, Proposing Courtship, FIRST 
THINGS, Oct. 1999, at 32, 41). 
 64 Id. at 285–86 (quoting Kass & Kass, supra note 63, at 40). 
 65 Id. at 285 (quoting Kass & Kass, supra note 63, at 33). 
 66 Id. at 282 (quoting Leon Kass, The End of Courtship, BOUNDLESS WEBZINE, 2005 http://www. 
boundless.org/2005/articles/a0001154.cfm). 
 67 Id. at 283. 
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II. IS THERE A “MALE PROBLEMATIC”—OR A “GOOD” OF FATHERHOOD—IN 
THE PLACE OF FAMILIES? 
Browning contends that a major limitation of The Place of Families is that 
it does not offer an account of the category of what he calls the “premoral” or 
“nonmoral goods” of life, including those “relevant to the well-being of 
families and children.”68  Indeed, he states that my “distaste” for such a 
discussion causes my call for toleration, or what I call toleration as respect,69 to 
become “a blanket approval of an indiscriminate variety of life styles.”70  
Although my book has “taken law to the doorstep of moral and political 
philosophy,” Browning argues, my attempt to bring moral and political theory 
to bear on law falls short because I do not augment my theory of justice and 
virtue with “indices of the premoral goods [of life] that justice should organize 
and virtue should serve.”71  Here, Browning finds my approach illustrative of a 
larger-scale weakness in contemporary legal theory about families.  Browning 
offers the “premoral good of fatherhood”—that is, responsible fatherhood and 
paternal care—as his primary example of what he finds missing in The Place 
of Families.72 
It is difficult to respond to this criticism because I am not certain what 
Browning means by the term “premoral goods.”  The term is not one found in 
contemporary family law or, for that matter, in the political theory on which 
my book draws.  The absence of “premoral goods” from my book is not, 
therefore, due to “distaste” on my part for the concept.  Browning explains that 
he takes the idea from neo-Thomistic theology and suggests it is similar to the 
idea of a “nonmoral good” found in certain moral philosophy.73  He suggests a 
distinction between saying something is a good of life, that is, important for 
human life, like water, and saying that something is in itself a direct moral 
good.74  He maintains that if we say that public authorities “should provide 
clear water equally for everyone,” then we are making a moral statement, or 
judgment, “about justice or fairness.”75 
 
 68 Browning, supra note 4, at 1392. 
 69 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 29–33. 
 70 Browning, supra note 4, at 1392. 
 71 Id. at 1393. 
 72 Id. at 1394. 
 73 Id. at 1393. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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Trying to relate a term drawn from theology and moral philosophy to the 
concerns of family law presents a challenge to my ability to have a 
constructive conversation with Professor Browning about this issue.  My book 
does not use the category “premoral goods,” but it does ask what sorts of goods 
are at stake in family life and what functions society expects family to fulfill.  
Is there common ground between my approach and critical familism on this 
issue?  To explore this, I will reformulate Professor Browning’s argument 
slightly to assume he might be making this kind of criticism: My proposed 
framework for reflecting on contemporary family law and policy fails to offer 
an adequate account of the full range of goods that are relevant to family life.  
In particular, my book, in Browning’s view, fails to give sufficient weight to 
the good of fathers’ care for their children and to the importance of marriage in 
securing this care. 
The Place of Families proposes an approach to family law that is attentive 
to the goods of family life, including the goods of marriage.  Early on, I 
propose that “[i]n the political order, families are simultaneously a site of 
private life and an institution of public importance because of the goods they 
foster and the functions they serve.”76  I explain that “[m]y approach to the 
place of families and how government should regulate them focuses not only 
on the goods associated with families and the functions they serve (for 
example, fostering relational responsibility and interdependence), but also on 
the relevant political values at stake.”77 
What goods, functions, and values are at stake when we speak of families?  
Borrowing an idea from John Rawls’s political liberalism, I suggest that a 
helpful point of departure is to reflect on political liberalism’s list of “primary 
goods” based on “what citizens need and require when they are regarded as 
[free and equal] persons and as normal and fully cooperating members of 
society over a complete life.”78  I argue that families play a vital role in a 
formative project of fostering persons’ capacities for democratic and personal 
self-government.  Further, I maintain that a focus on primary goods, human 
needs, or capacities “suggests at least three tasks for families.”79  Two tasks 
that relate to the process of social reproduction—how society reproduces itself 
 
 76 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 22. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 19 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 178 (1996)).  To be sure, The Place of 
Families does not attempt to offer a detailed list of the goods of human life, by analogy to Martha Nussbaum’s 
account of basic human capabilities.  Id. 
 79 Id. at 20. 
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by “preparing persons to take their place as capable, responsible, self-
governing members of society”—are providing care to dependent members 
and supporting the political order by cultivating important virtues.80  A third 
task is “to afford adults the chance to realize the goods of intimate association” 
such as love, intimacy, mutuality, interdependence, and friendship.”81 
What political or public values are at stake in the institution of family?  
Professor Browning suggests my account is skewed toward an uncritical 
embrace of family diversity and the aggressive promotion of sex equality.  
However, these are part of a broader family of relevant political values, 
resembling those listed by Rawls: “the freedom and equality of women, the 
equality of children as future citizens, the freedom of religion, and . . . the 
value of the family in securing the orderly production and reproduction of 
society and of its culture from one generation to the next.”82  To this list I add 
the political value of autonomy in intimate matters and equality among 
families.83 
Care, then, in my approach is a basic task of families.  My book devotes a 
chapter to the importance of care—in particular, parental care for children—
and so it seems odd to charge that I ignore the premoral goods of family life.  
How do my approach and critical familism compare on the issue of care?  How 
does the “male problematic” feature in our analyses? 
Care, I explain, is foundational and fundamental: “A just society must 
ensure that its members are able to meet their basic needs for nurture, care, 
food, shelter, and other material goods.”84  Feminist analysis has helpfully 
focused attention on care as a precondition for civic and democratic life and 
revealed both how society locates the primary responsibility for providing care 
in families and how, within families, women continue to have disproportionate 
responsibility for providing such care.85  Using the two practical examples of 
welfare-to-work policy and work/family or work/life conflict, my book argues 
that care should be seen as both a personal (and parental) and public 
 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 21. 
 82 Id. at 22 (quoting John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 793 
(1997)). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 21. 
 85 Id. at 21, 89–90 (discussing, for example, MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A 
THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 284–87 (2004); Berenice Fisher & Joan Tronto, Toward a Feminist Theory of 
Caring, in CIRCLES OF CARE 35, 40 (1990); EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR 29–42 (Emily K. Abel & 
Margaret K. Nelson eds., 1999)). 
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responsibility and as a public value warranting governmental support.86  I 
critique the continuing vestiges of the gendered economy of care, and I urge 
that responsibility for care be redistributed between women and men within 
families and that employers and government better recognize and support the 
work that families do in providing care to their members.87 
Using Browning’s framework, I could be saying, in other words, that care 
is both a “premoral good” and that it is morally good that society support such 
care.  Browning and I also seem to have considerable common ground with 
respect to the importance of care and society’s interest in securing men’s 
participation in providing it.  The Place of Families critiques the gendered 
division of labor for care giving and points out that this has costs for men as 
well as for women and children.  I propose to support and recognize care as a 
public value in ways that treat care giving as a responsibility for both mothers 
and fathers and that facilitate both mothers and fathers integrating family and 
work responsibilities.  So, too, critical familism advocates that “fathers and 
mothers have in principle equal access to the responsibilities and the privileges 
of both the public and domestic realms” and calls for a reduced work week.88  I 
support a reduced work week along with other policy reforms, and I argue that 
society should aim to foster child well-being without sacrificing gender 
equality. 
How, then, do critical familism and my approach to care and parental 
responsibility differ?  It is fair to say that critical familism and my approach to 
family law have some distinctive concerns.  One important difference is that 
the motivational question that occupies critical familism and the marriage 
movement—i.e., how can society ensure that men will responsibly commit to 
their sexual partners and invest in their children?— is not the motivating 
concern of my book.  Professor Browning’s notion of the “male problematic,” 
as noted above, is that society requires marriage as a mechanism to ensure 
paternal investment because of men’s tendency not to invest in their offspring.  
Indeed, Browning expresses concern that embracing too much family diversity 
causes one to lose sight of the preferability of the marital family as the optimal 
form for securing such paternal investment in children.89  As a guide to social 
policy, his “marriage plus” approach would continue to affirm marriage 
between a man and a woman as the normative family form but adopt some 
 
 86 Id. at 89–91. 
 87 Id. at 88–114. 
 88 BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 328. 
 89 Browning, supra note 4, at 1401–02. 
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social welfare measures to accommodate a certain amount of inevitable family 
diversity.90  By contrast, he charges that my approach to fostering not only 
equality within families but also equality among families would jeopardize the 
special place of marriage in the name of a more indiscriminate acceptance of 
diversity, regardless of the impact on paternal investment and thus on 
children.91 
Equality is, admittedly, a central concern of my book.  Indeed, one 
motivation for my book was the puzzle that those who call for stronger 
families and marriages tend to perceive tension between the goals of 
strengthening families and promoting sex equality.  But equality is neither the 
book’s only animating concern nor an isolated value.  My book attempts to 
make sense of the common intuition that a significant link exists between the 
state of families and the state of the nation.  I argue that underlying this 
intuition is an important idea: Families have a place in the project of forming 
persons into capable, responsible, self-governing citizens.92  My book offers a 
framework for thinking about that formative project, stressing three salient 
ideas: fostering the capacity for democratic and personal self-government, 
fostering equality within and among families, and fostering the responsibility 
of individuals to make personal decisions about sexual intimacy, marriage, 
reproduction, and parenting.93 
To understand better how my approach and critical familism differ, it may 
be helpful to tease out how a notion of a “male problematic,” shaped by 
feminist sensibilities, features in my book and how this problematic relates to 
the problems of family law.  Women’s disproportionate responsibility for care 
is one manifestation of a feminist “male problematic” identified in my book.  
As noted above, I offer proposals for how law and policy can best ameliorate 
the gendered economy of care.  But there are other manifestations of such a 
problematic. 
First, reflecting its feminist roots, The Place of Families critiques historical 
forms of inequality within the family linked to the hierarchy—sanctioned in 
family law and political theory—between husband and wife.  Indeed, it argues 
that contemporary appeals to the important idea that families are “seedbeds of 
civic virtue” often fail to reckon with the history of sex inequality within the 
 
 90 Id. at 1400–01. 
 91 Id. at 1401–02. 
 92 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 3. 
 93 Id. at 4–9. 
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family.94  Building on Susan Moller Okin’s influential book, Justice, Gender, 
and the Family,95 it identifies lingering forms of such inequality that pose 
continuing problems: domestic violence and women’s disproportionate 
responsibility for care giving and housework within families.  Identifying sex 
equality as a constitutional commitment relevant to family life, my book urges 
that government should more firmly embrace and support equality between 
women and men within families.  It explains that a commitment to toleration, 
or governmental restraint, does not bar government from addressing the 
problem of violence and unjust domination within families. 
Second, my book contends that contemporary calls to strengthen families 
and promote marriage are too often, at best, ambivalent about sex equality and, 
at worst, view greater equality between women and men within families as an 
obstacle to securing stable family life.  I believe that critical familism has 
similar concerns, as evidenced by its criticisms of some religious groups’ 
embrace of male headship of the family and of a traditional breadwinner-
caregiver division of labor as important to strong families.96  I am puzzled, 
therefore, that Browning regards my embrace of sex equality as overly 
aggressive or zealous and as too mistrustful of civil society’s ability to support 
marriage or responsible fatherhood. 
What I do say is that if government is to enter into public-private 
partnerships with religious organizations to carry out such tasks as promoting 
responsible fatherhood, marriage education, and sex education, the 
constitutional value of sex equality (to say nothing of the Establishment 
Clause) precludes it from funding, or otherwise lending its imprimatur to, 
religious conceptions of family that embrace gender hierarchy or a fixed vision 
of sex roles (such as women as sexual gatekeepers or men as “head of 
household”).  I do not argue that these religious groups may not advance those 
conceptions in society.  Rather, I argue that family law and policy have moved 
away from a model of marriage premised on gender hierarchy and fixed roles 
for husband and wife.  Likewise, it would be wrong for government to enlist 
private actors to promote marriage by promoting such visions of family life.  In 
other words, if government is to attempt to promote “healthy marriage,” it 
must do so without promoting patriarchy.  What is more, I have argued, 
drawing in part on Browning’s own work, that a prudent way to support 
 
 94 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 50–84. 
 95 SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989). 
 96 BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 219–46. 
MCCLAIN FINAL_EMORY WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 05, 2007  7:12 AM 
2007] A RESPONSE TO “CRITICAL FAMILISM” 1423 
“healthy marriage” would be to recognize the important link between 
perceptions of marriage quality and sex equality.97 
Third, equality among families is a concern of The Place of Families.  It is 
here, perhaps, that my approach and critical familism—and the marriage 
movement, more generally—may diverge the most.  In contrast to the marriage 
movement, I strongly support extending marriage to same-sex couples.  I do 
this not due to an indiscriminate embrace of diversity, but rather based on an 
argument appealing to the goods of family life, the capacities of gay men and 
lesbians, and relevant political values.98  Another proposal I make, of which 
Professor Browning is quite critical, is to develop a registration system, which 
would allow persons in close relationships to have a formal status attached to 
some set of benefits, obligations, and protections.  I do not say, contrary to his 
critique, that all close relationships should receive the protective umbrella 
linked to marriage; rather, I contend that government may legitimately 
calibrate the menu of rights to the menu of responsibilities to which partners 
agree.99  My argument here, again, rests not on an indiscriminate embrace of 
diversity.  Instead, I ask whether such relationships “have not only private 
significance (for their contribution to personal happiness and well-being), but 
also public significance, rooted in important social goods they realize and 
functions they serve (such as meeting dependencies, giving care, or fostering 
civic virtues).”100  A genuine disagreement between my approach and that of 
critical familism is whether this sort of move “beyond marriage” would 
undermine marriage, weaken paternal investment, and be harmful to children’s 
well-being.101 
A final form of inequality among families that is of concern to me as well 
as to Professor Browning is the fact that some men and women aspire to marry 
but do not because of economic factors.  Like the marriage movement, I, too, 
am concerned that economic inequality is a barrier to marriage and that there 
may be a “marriage gap” between the affluent and the poor.  A related problem 
is that economic disadvantage and other forms of inequality contribute to early 
 
 97 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 153–54; see Don S. Browning, What Kind of Love? The Equal-Regard 
Marriage and Children, 4 AMER. EXPERIMENT QUART. 47 (2001). 
 98 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 155–90. 
 99 Id. at 209. 
 100 Id. at 197. 
 101 For example, about forty percent of cohabiting households include children, and I argue that a 
registration option might help to contribute to the stability of the adult relationships, and thus, to such 
children’s well-being.  Id. at 198, 207–08. 
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pregnancy and parenthood.102  But here I diverge from the marriage movement 
and from governmental efforts to promote “healthy marriage” in at least two 
respects.  These bear on the issue of a “male problematic.”  First, I argue that 
concerns not only about economics but also about relationship quality deter 
some low-income women from marrying.  Research on low-income unmarried 
parents finds that a significant obstacle to stable family life is gender conflict 
or gender distrust.  This distrust relates to quality issues like infidelity, 
violence, and whether marriage will be premised on an equal partnership rather 
than male dominance.  This might be cast as a form of a “male problematic.”  
As some researchers concluded, if “healthy marriage” programs seek to 
encourage women’s positive attitudes toward marriage and reduce their 
distrust, this “may well require men to change the behavior that leads to 
distrust or negative attitudes.”103  Relational conflict and violence are among 
the reasons for this distrust.  Moreover, state-wide surveys conducted with 
welfare funds as part of marriage promotion initiatives find both that women 
more than men, and lower-income people more than the affluent, identify 
violence as a significant factor leading to divorce.104 
Browning comments that I miss the point that women in marriages are at 
lower risk for domestic violence than women in cohabiting or dating 
relationships.105  But my point was not this comparative one.  Rather, it was 
that, given that gender distrust is an obstacle to marriage and that violence 
within marriage is a significant factor leading to divorce, for women and for 
low-income partners, efforts to promote “healthy marriage” that focus 
primarily on improving unmarried men’s economic prospects to make them 
more “marriageable” do not go far enough.  Concern for the quality of family 
life and of marital relationships—which relates in turn to equality within 
marriage—should be treated as equally important.  Moreover, some 
researchers have proposed that a path to greater marriageability would be 
greater acceptance of nontraditional family roles for men, such as active 
nurturing, especially for men with lower earning capacity.106 
A second point of tension between my own approach and that of the 
marriage movement is whether marriage promotion should be the primary 
 
 102 Id. at 263–68. 
 103 Id. at 332 n.93 (quoting Marcia Carlson, Sara McLanahan & Paula England, Union Formation in 
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focus of helping low-income unmarried parents.  For example, a serious 
question for welfare law and policy is whether efforts to promote responsible 
fatherhood should support only social services that emphasize marital 
fatherhood as the only form of responsible fatherhood.  I support marriage 
education, but I also concur with those scholars who argue for seeking to 
strengthen families as they actually exist.  Research on “fragile families,” a 
term used to describe low-income, unmarried parents who have separated 
parenthood from marriage, finds that the gap between such couples’ ideals 
about marriage and actual practices rests in part on a combination of economic 
and other obstacles to marriage.107  However, most of these mothers and 
fathers—whether or not they have a current romantic involvement with each 
other—do value having the fathers’ continuing involvement in the child’s 
life.108  Governmental efforts that go beyond marriage education to include a 
broader spectrum of supportive programs could help to encourage responsible 
fatherhood and cooperative parenting even if they are not anchored within 
marriage. 
Would critical familism’s “marriage plus” approach concur with 
approaches that help actual families as they presently exist, or would it worry 
that such an approach would weaken the institution of marriage?  The marriage 
movement focuses on marriage as the crucial societal mechanism for securing 
paternal investment.  Here, by contrast, the argument is made that encouraging 
active, nurturing fatherhood by young men—whether they are married or 
unmarried—may be an effective mechanism for improving adult-adult 
relationships.  As one report commissioned by the federal government posed 
the question, “Can increasing men’s commitment to active fathering be a 
mechanism for improving union quality and stability?”109  Critical familism 
might well counter that society should aspire to link marriage and parenthood 
more tightly.  But whatever the normative ideals that undergird family law, 
family law and welfare policy have to meet people in the actual circumstances 
in which they currently live.  If marriage is not an appropriate goal for some 
men and women, programs seeking to improve parenting skills and the 
coparenting relationship could at least strengthen family life for families as 
 
 107 See generally Center for Research on Child Wellbeing, http://crcw.princeton.edu (last visited Feb. 11, 
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 108 See RON MINCY ET AL., TEMP. ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY FAMILIES (“TANF”), FRAGILE FAMILIES IN 
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they currently exist.110  A comprehensive approach to services could help those 
couples for whom “healthy marriage” is a desired outcome as well as couples 
who, although they would make poor marriage partners, could more easily 
move to a healthy coparenting relationship and thus more stable family life.111 
CONCLUSION 
My project and critical familism share a common point of departure: 
concern over the contentious public debates in the United States over families.  
However, the aim of The Place of Families, by contrast to Professor 
Browning’s project, was not to synthesize and critically retrieve religious 
tradition, but rather it was to offer a framework, grounded in family law and 
political theory, for approaching contentious debates about the place of 
families in our political order and a number of issues of family law.  In his 
review, Professor Browning gestures toward a larger question that he invites 
family law scholars—and legal scholars, as a more general matter—to take up: 
what is “the relation of religion to the law in a pluralistic and democratic 
society?”112 
In an earlier exchange with me about critical familism, Professor Browning 
argued that “positions on family theory informed by explicitly religious 
sources have the right to enter into deliberations aimed to shape public policy,” 
provided that they “advance their arguments in publicly accessible ways.”113  
As I observed in response, his premise that, out of engagement with and 
critical retrieval of classic texts about marriage in the Western tradition (and 
non-Western religious traditions), there “would emerge a public philosophy 
about marriage on which there would be widespread cultural agreement has 
some resemblance to political liberalism’s appeal to an overlapping consensus, 
where persons can draw upon their comprehensive moral views to find 
agreement about important political principles or public values.”114  The Place 
of Families draws on this dimension of political liberalism.  However, 
Professor Browning seems to quest for a comprehensive public moral 
 
 110 Id.  Given the high rates of unintended pregnancies experienced by unmarried, low-income couples, 
programs aimed at sex education, pregnancy prevention, and family planning would also be helpful.  See 
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philosophy about marriage, which takes its values and moral claims from 
religious texts, and seems to blur the distinctions between civil and religious 
marriage. 
This fusion of the civil and religious is clear, for example, in the recent 
statement, Marriage and the Public Good: Ten Principles, to which Professor 
Browning was a signatory.  Marriage and the Public Good expresses, as one 
principle, that “‘[c]ivil marriage’ and ‘religious marriage’ cannot be rigidly or 
completely divorced from one another”; it aims to “preserve some shared idea 
of what marriage is that transcends the differences between religious and 
secular marriages and between marriages within our nation’s many diverse 
religious traditions.”115  I contend that it is not an appropriate task for the state 
to pursue or seek to implement such a comprehensive philosophy, given the 
reasonable diversity of views among people about sexuality, family, and 
marriage, including diversity within specific religious traditions.  Nor is it 
appropriate for legislatures and courts, when regulating and adjudicating 
marriage as a civil institution, to aim to advance a religious conception of 
marriage. 
Undeniably, religious conceptions of marriage have shaped contemporary 
family law.  Thus, a complicating factor in considering the place of religion in 
family law in a pluralistic constitutional democracy is that, although 
contemporary discourse about marriage emphasizes that civil marriage, as 
distinct from religious marriage, is, in a sense, a creature of state law and 
regulation,116  America’s history reveals the strong influence of Christian 
conceptions of marriage on the secular law.117  Indeed, in the informative 
volume coedited by Browning, American Religions and the Family, the late 
Lee Teitelbaum observed, “For a considerable part of American history, the 
posture of public authority was consistent with positions taken by the dominant 
religious culture . . . .  For most of American history, . . . the law of marriage 
was consistent with and supported—if not created—by the views of dominant 
religious communities.”118 Yet Teitelbaum further observes the 
disestablishment of religious and civil family law.  “[S]ince the 1950s this 
 
 115 THE WITHERSPOON INST., MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: TEN PRINCIPLES 14 (2006), 
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close association of dominant religious views and marriage laws has weakened 
dramatically” (as the tension between the religious ideal of marital permanence 
and the advent of no-fault divorce illustrates).119 
An intriguing question arising out of the consideration of this history of the 
intertwining and disentangling of family law and religion is what the 
conception of civil marriage is and whether various religious communities find 
this understanding of marriage compatible with or threatening to their own 
conception of marriage.  As Mary Anne Case has observed, what “marriage 
licenses” today is quite different from what it licensed in an earlier era, when 
marriage entailed a hierarchical set of rights and duties of husband and wife 
(baron and feme) and the criminal law prohibited nonmarital, nonprocreative, 
and nonheterosexual sexual expression.120  Today, by contrast, much of that 
criminal law has given way to understandings of a realm of constitutionally 
protected liberty and privacy.  And, pursuant to the transformation of family 
law spurred by the Supreme Court’s series of equal protection rulings, 
although civil marriage does entail certain rights and obligations, they are 
stated in gender-neutral terms.  Spouses are much freer to choose how to live 
their marital life, and the rules of exit are far less strict. 
What civil marriage licenses, thus, is, no doubt, at considerable odds with 
at least some religious conceptions of marriage.  In taking up Professor 
Browning’s question about the place of religion in shaping family law, we 
need to give attention to possible points of tension between these civil and 
religious conceptions.  For example, I suspect that one point of tension will be 
the issue of gender roles in the family.  Contemporary family law has rejected 
the common law’s model of husbandly rule and wifely obedience.  In The 
Place of Families, I contend that sex equality is an important political value 
and constitutional principle as well as a commitment of family law.  In 
Browning’s new anthology,121 a theme in nearly every chapter is that a 
traditional tenet in religious understandings of the home and family is that men 
are to exercise authority or leadership in the home (e.g., “headship”) and that 
women have special duties in the home, including (in some traditions) some 
form of submission to or respect for male authority.  In coping with 
modernization, religious leaders and religious adherents face the challenge of 
how to reconcile traditional religious beliefs about male authority in the family 
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with contemporary American values about equality of the sexes and marriage 
as a partnership.  To be sure, some religious traditions themselves have moved 
away from teachings about male dominance and female submission and fixed 
gender roles to more egalitarian visions of marriage and family.  Critical 
familism, similarly, advocates an egalitarian vision.  By contrast, some 
embrace traditional gender roles as part of an “oppositional” stance to 
American culture and the perceived weakening of family values.122 
The issue of diverse religious views about gender roles and the degree to 
which they support or oppose contemporary family law is but one of a number 
of issues raised by Professor Browning’s quest to bring religion to bear on 
shaping family law and policy.  I welcome critical familism’s further 
engagement with the problems of family law. 
 
 122 See Margaret Bendroth, Evangelicals, Family, and Modernity, in AMERICAN RELIGIONS AND THE 
FAMILY: HOW FAITH TRADITIONS COPE WITH MODERNIZATION AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 118, at 56. 
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